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Abstract
Both deeper market integration and advances in digital technology
have driven particularly large decreases in the costs of inter-market
software provision. In this note, we rst explain the mechanism of
how trade costs inuence the software provision decision of software
rms. Then, we investigated the transformation of production/trade
patterns given gradually decreasing trade costs for software products.
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It is shown that, given that two incompatible hardware exist, deeper
market integration may reduce the variety of hardware technologies.
It is also shown that, if the variety of hardware technologies is reduced
by deeper integration, some consumers are made worse o. In other
words, deeper market integration, which forms the basis for a greater
variety of software products may work as a catalyst for Pareto inferior
outcomes.
KeyWords: software provision; indirect network eects; hardware/software
systems; market integration; Pareto inferior outcome
JEL Classication: D43, F12, R12
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1 Introduction
Two of the most important trends in the global economy in recent decades
have been (1) the dramatic increase in the role of information-intensive prod-
ucts (e.g., various types of computer software products and IT-related ser-
vices) in economic activities, and (2) the decline in inter-market transaction
costs such as transport and communications costs. Both deepening mar-
ket integration and advances in digital technology have driven particularly
large decreases in the costs of inter-market software provision. With lower
costs has occurred a growing connectivity of individuals and organizations
achieved through improved communications networks (e.g., the Internet and
the satellite communications networks) and a consequent increase in the ow
of information-intensive software provision across markets.1
Since these changes due to deeper market integration often provides an
opportunity to acquire varieties of products not available from domestic pro-
ducers, welfare gains via increased product diversication are emphasized in
the trade/regional economy literature.2 As yet, however, little attention has
been paid to the impact of market integration on software provision in the
1According to this point, Illing and Peitz (2006) present stylized facts on software
indutries.
2See, for example, Fujita et al. (1999) and Behrens et al. (2007).
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presence of indirect network eects.
Indirect network eects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing
in the variety of complementary \software" products available for a \hard-
ware" device. Examples of such devices include personal computers, video
casette recorders, and consumer electronics products. It is important to note
that not only electronic products but also IT-related services exhibit strong
indirect network eects. Internet auction site such as eBay provides a good
example: the more users sells through eBay (\hardware" in our terminology),
the greater the variety of items (\software" in our terminology) that can be
found, and the greater the value of buying through eBay. These examples
suggest that the concept of indirect network eects has a wide applicability
in the modern economy.
Despite the fact that many industries have indirect network eects that
are supported by deeper market integration, the literature on indirect net-
work eects is almost exclusively focused on a single market.3 Because the
3The seminal contributions on the role of a \hardware/software" system are Chou and
Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992). See Economides (1996), Gandal (2002), Farrell
and Klemperer (2007) for surveys of the relevant literature. In the international context,
Gandal and Shy (2001) analyze governments' incentives to recognize foreign standards
when there are network eects. See, also, Kikuchi (2003, 2007) for the analysis of trade
liberalization in the presence of network eects.
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role of indirect network eects is amplied in the globalized world, it seems
important to explore the impact of market integration in the presence of
products with indirect network eects.
As our primary contribution, we extend Church and Gandal (1992)'s sin-
gle market model with two incompatible hardware technologies to an inter-
national (or regional) trade environment with two markets:4 we emphasize
the role of inter-market trade costs which includes not only shipping costs
but also diculty of communication, information barriers, etc., and show
how deeper market integration (i.e., a reduction in trade costs) aects the
software provision decision of software rms.5 It is shown that, given that
two incompatible hardware exist, deeper market integration may reduce the
variety of hardware technologies. It is also shown that, if the variety of hard-
ware technologies is reduced by deeper integration, some consumers are made
worse o. In other words, deeper market integration, which forms the basis
for a greater variety of software products (i.e., intensied indirect network
4Based on the Hotelling's spatial approach, Schmitt (1993, 1995) investigate the rms'
product choise in a two-market environment. Also, in order to analyze the possibility of
coalition formation among suppliers of retail services, Henkel et al. (2000) adapt the work
of Church and Gandal (1992) to a spatial economy setting.
5Recent empirical studies suggest that trade costs are still large, even aside from trade-
policy barriers and even between apparently highly integrated economies. See Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004) for surveys of the relevant literature.
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eects), may work as a catalyst for Pareto inferior outcomes.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
basic model. Section 3 analyze trading equilibrium and Section 4 considers
the impact of deeper market integration (i.e., a reduction in trade costs).
Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the basic setup of the model: both technology and
consumers' preferences are specied. Then, is the next section, the trading
equilibrium with positive transport costs is explained in detail.
Suppose that there are two countries (or regions), Home and Foreign,
and that they are identical in regard to tastes, size, and technology.6 In each
country there are three types of goods: hardware, a large variety of software
products, and the outside good. We assume that there are two hardware
technologies in both countries: Hardware 0 and Hardware 1. We also assume
that the hardware technologies are incompatible: software written for one
hardware will not work with the other's. Without the provision of compatible
software, no consumers will purchase a hardware.
A market in each country is dened as a line of unit length representing
6In this way, we rule out Ricardian comparative advantage.
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both consumers' set of preferences and the rms' attribute space for hard-
ware products. The characterization of the two hardware technologies is
exogenous: each is located at the end point of the unit line: let Hardware 0's
technology be at the left end point and Hardware 1's technology at the right
end point. We denote the marginal cost of each hardware production by c.
We further assume that the hardware technologies are non-proprietary and
that they will be oered at marginal cost.
Following Church and Gandal (1992), consumer preferences over the com-
bination of hardware and software are modelled as a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
CES utility function. We assume that the distribution of the tastes of Home
(Foreign) consumers is uniform along a line of unit length s 2 [0; 1]. In each
country, the consumers' density is uniform and equal to 1.
The preferences of a Home consumer of type s for system h (h = 0; 1)
are:
U(s; h) =
24 nhX
i
(xhi )
 +
nhX
i
(xhi)

35(1=) +   kjs  hj; (1=2) <  < 1; (1)
where nh (nh) is the number of Home (resp. Foreign) software products
written for Hardware h, xhi (resp. x
h
i) is the level of consumption of software
product i (resp. i) written for Hardware h,   1=(1   ) > 2 is the
elasticity of substitution between every pair of software products, and we
assume that  > k. k is a measure of the degree of product dierentiation
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between the hardware technologies: the greater k, the greater the degree of
dierentiation.
Inter-market trade in software products is inhibited by frictional trade
barriers, which are modeled as iceberg costs a la Samuelson: for one unit of
the software product to reach the other country (or region), t 2 (1;1) units
must be shipped.7 Thus, the price of an imported software product to Home
consumers will be tph , where p
h
 is the producer's price for software products
written in Foreign. Inter-market trade cost includes all impediments to trade,
such as shipping costs per se, but also dierent product standards, diculty
of communication, information barriers and cultural dierences.
The representative consumer who purchases Hardware h will maximize
(1) subject to the following budget constraint:
nhX
i
phi x
h
i +
nhX
i
tphix
h
i = e  c; (2)
where phi (resp. p
h
i) is the price of Home (resp. Foreign) software variety i
(resp. i) for Hardware h, e is the total expenditure allocated to hardware
and software, and c is the price (i.e., cost) of a unit of Hardware h.
The solution to this problem consists of the following demand functions:
xhi = (e  c)(P h) 1=(phi ); (3)
xhi = (e  c)(P h) 1=(tphi); (4)
7See Ottaviano and Thisse (2004, p.2581).
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where
P h =
24 nhX
j
(phj )
1 
+
nhX
j
(tphj)
1 
351=(1 ): (5)
If the prices of software product are identical among countries (i.e., phi =
phi = p
h), the CES price index (5) simplies to
P h = ph(nh + nh)
1=(1 )
; (6)
where   t1  2 (0; 1) is the measure of the freeness of trade, which increases
as t falls and is equal to one when trade is costless (t = 1). Note that  can
be interpreted as an `weight' on imported software products: the price index
is decreasing in  .
The indirect utility of a type-s consumer who purchases a system h is
V (s; h) =
[(nh + nh)
1=( 1)
(e  c)]
ph
+   kjs  hj: (7)
The indirect utility function is concave in (nh + nh): the marginal benet
of additional software variety is decreasing.
Now, let us turn to the cost structure of software provision. The tech-
nology for the production of software is characterized by increasing returns
to scale, since software creation typically involves xed costs. We denote the
constant marginal cost of software production for every product by b, and
the software development cost by f .
We assume that software rms are monopolistic competitors. With the
9
total number of products available to consumers being very large, each pro-
ducer chooses its constant markup prices as:8
p = p = b=(   1): (8)
3 Trading Equilibrium
In this section, we specify a simple game in which the strategy of each soft-
ware rm in a decision to provide software for either hardware, 0 or 1. The
timing of the game is as follows:9 In the rst stage software rms enter the
industry. There is free entry into the software industry and software rms
have rational expectations. Although there may be more than one equilib-
rium software conguration, we show that the free-entry number of software
rms, N = n0 + n1 (resp. N = n0 + n
1
), is unique,
10 where nh (resp. nh)
is the number of rms providing software for Hardware h in Home (resp.
Foreign). Since two countries are identical in regard to tastes, size, and tech-
nology, it is easily shown that N = N holds. Also, in order to emphasize
the role of trade costs, we restrict our attention to the case of symmetric
equilibrium where nh = nh holds. In other words, we concentrate on the case
8Hereafter, we drop the superscript h.
9This is taken from Church and Gandal's (1992) single market model.
10See Subsection 3.3.
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where each country's equilibrium conguration is identical. From the con-
sumers' viewpoint, this implies that the eective number of software varieties
for Hardware h is (1 + )nh [see equation (7)].
In the second stage, software rms simultaneously choose which platform
to provide software for. In the nal stage, each consumer purchases either a
Hardware 0 or a Hardware 1 system and some of the compatible software.
We solve this problem backward.
3.1 Final Stage
Since we assume the marginal costs (prices) of hardware and software are
equal for both systems, consumers determine which hardware to purchase
considering only their tastes and the amount of software available for each
system. From (5), a consumer located at s purchases Hardware 0 if the
following inequality holds:
[(1 + )n0]
1=( 1)
(e  c)
p
+ ks > [(1 + )(N   n0)]
1=( 1)(e  c)
p
+ k(1 s);
(9)
where use has been made of the equation n0 + n1 = N . Therefore, the
location of the marginal consumer who purchase Hardware 0 is given by a
function of n0, that is,
s(n0) = T ()
[(n0)
1=( 1)   (N   n0)1=( 1)](e  c)(   1)
2kb
+
1
2
; (10)
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T ()  (1 + )1=( 1): (11)
And the rst derivative of s(n0) is positive:
s0(n0)  ds(n
0)
dn0
=
T ()[(n0)
(2 )=( 1)
+ (N   n0)(2 )=( 1)](e  c)
2kb
> 0:
(12)
This means that the share of Hardware 0 is increasing in the amount of
software for it. It can also be shown that
s(0)  0 and s(N)  1 () [(1 + )N ]1=( 1)  kb=[(e  c)(   1)]
(13)
and
s0(N=2)  1=N () [(1 + )N ]1=( 1)  21=( 1)kb=2(e  c): (14)
Based on the above, the function s(n0) can be depicted as curves in Figure
1,11 where curves A, B, and C correspond to the graph of s(n0) under each
of the following three cases: in case A, t  t  [N=(K  N)]1=( 1); where
N = [(e   c)=f] and K  kb=[(e  c)(   1)] ; in case B, t > t > t 
11The second derivative of s(n0) is negative (positive) if n0 is smaller (greater) than
N=2, since
d2s(n0)
d(n0)
2 =  
T ()[(n0)
(3 2)=( 1)   (N   n0)(3 2)=( 1)](   2)(e  c)
2kb(   1) ;
where  > 2 from the assumption  > 1=2.
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(N=(K 0  N))1=( 1); and in case C, t  t.12 The three curves are drawn for
high, intermediate, and low levels of inter-market trade costs, respectively.
Note that in cases B and C, s(n0) can reach 0 or 1, even if there are still
two types of software. Since the market is of unit length, that is, 0  s  1,
there exists a critical number of software rms for each type of hardware such
that if the number of software rms for one technology exceeds the critical
number, then all consumers purchase the dominant hardware. On the other
hand, in case A, there are two types of consumers unless one hardware is
standardized; no software for the other hardware exists.13
3.2 Second Stage
In the second stage, software rms simultaneously select the network for
which to supply software are. Given the marginal consumer, s, in each
country, and the number of competing software rms ((1+)n0 or (1+)n1),
the prot of a software rm writing software for Hardware 0 is
0(s; n0) = (1 + )s(p  b)x0   f = s(e  c)
n0
  f; (15)
12The importance of discrimination between case B and C will appear in the following.
13Since we assume that hardware only facilitates the consumption of software and pro-
vides no stand-alone benets, in case A, the marginal consumer, s, changes discontinuously
to 0 or 1 when n0 is equal to 0 or N .
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where x0 = (e   c)=[(1 + )n0p]. Note that, due to the presence of inter-
market trade costs, prots from exporting is discounted by an weight  . The
prot of a software rm for Hardware 1 is
1(s; n1) = (1 + )(1  s)(p  b)x1   f = (1  s)(e  c)
n1
  f; (16)
where x1 = (e   c)=[(1 + )n1p]. From these equations, it is easily derived
that
0(s; n0)
>
<
1(s; n1) () s >
<
n0
N
: (17)
Based on the latter inequality, each rm considers whether s(n0) is greater
than n0=N or not, and then chooses the network to supply.
3.3 First Stage
At any equilibrium where two networks coexist, 0(s; n0) = 1(s; n1) must
be satised. Therefore, s = n0=N holds at the equilibrium and
0 = 1 =
(e  c)
N
  f: (18)
On the other hand, if all software rms provide software for one network at
equilibrium, then (s; n0) = (1; N) or (s; n1) = (0; N) hold and
0 =
(e  c)
N
  f or 1 = (e  c)
N
  f: (19)
Thus, the prot of each rm is independent of equilibrium software congu-
rations, and the free-entry number of rms in each country, N , is uniquely
14
given as
N =
(e  c)
f
: (20)
Based on the foregoing argument, we can conclude that 0 = 1 = 0 holds
for any pair (s; n0) on the dotted line in Figure 1, 0 = 0 at (1; N), and
1 = 0 at (0; 0), while 0 (1) is positive (negative) at any pair above the
line and vice versa.
3.4 Nash Equilibrium Congurations
Based on the foregoing argument, we obtain the Nash equilibrium congu-
rations as follows: In order for a conguration to be a Nash equilibrium, it
must be impossible for a software rm to switch networks and increase its
prot.
In case A, the graph of s(n0) is drawn as curve A in Figure 1. So, there
are three equilibrium candidates; (n0 = n1 = N=2), (n0 = N; n1 = 0), and
(n0 = 0; n1 = N). Since
s(n0)
8>><>>:
> n0=N if n0 < N=2;
< n0=N if n0 > N=2;
(21)
we can conclude that only symmetric equilibrium (n0 = n1 = n0 = n
1
 = N=2)
is stable in the sense of a Nash equilibrium.
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On the other hand, in case C, the graph is drawn as curve C and
s(n0)
8>><>>:
< n0=N if n0 < N=2;
> n0=N if n0 > N=2:
(22)
Therefore, only two equilibria, (n0 = n0 = N; n
1 = n1 = 0) and (n
0 = n0 =
0; n1 = n1 = N), are stable.
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Finally, in case B, the graph of s(n) is drawn as curve B and it is apparent
from the discussion above that all three of the equilibria, (n0 = n1 = n0 =
n1 = N=2), (n
0 = n0 = N; n
1 = n1 = 0), and (n
0 = n0 = 0; n
1 = n1 = N),
are stable. So, we have the following lemma:
Lemma: Depending on the parameter values, the following three cases
emerge:
Case A: If t  t  [N=(K  N)]1=( 1); where N = [(e   c)=f] and
K  kb=[(e  c)(   1)], a unique symmetric equilibrium exists, (n0 = n1 =
n0 = n
1
 = N=2).
Case B: If t > t > t  (N=(K 0  N))1=( 1), whereK 0  (21=( 1)kb)=[2(e  c)],
three equilibria, (n0 = n1 = n0 = n
1
 = N=2); (n
0 = n0 = N; n
1 = n1 = 0),
and (n0 = n0 = 0; n
1 = n1 = N), exist.
Case C: If t  t, only two equilibria, (n0 = N; n1 = 0) and (n0 = n0 =
14In the interval of n where s(n0) is greater than 1 (smaller than 0), the actual marginal
consumer, s, is equal to 1 (0) and is still above (below) the line s = n0=N .
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0; n1 = n1 = N), exist.
There is one important thing to note about the eect of deeper mar-
ket integration: the gradient of s(n0) in the neighborhood of the symmetric
equilibrium is increased, and that change tends to make the symmetric equi-
librium less stable. Figure 1 suggests that deeper market integration, by
intensifying indirect network eects, increases the extent to which a given
number of software varieties is consistent with hardware/software standard-
ization.
4 The Impact of Market Integration
Now let us turn to the impact of deeper market integration (i.e., a gradual
decrease in trade costs for software products).15 A reduction in inter-market
trade costs (i.e., a larger ) implies one basic change: the eective number of
software varieties, (1+)nh, becomes larger. This implies that the integrated
market can support an easier access to software products.16 Since consumers
prefer to consume a wide variety of software products, deeper market inte-
gration might result in gains from product diversication. However, we have
15The case of a move from closed economy to full trade liberalization is discussed in
Iwasa and Kikuchi (2008).
16Note that the total number of software varieties remained unchanged as 2N .
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to check the changes in the variety of hardware.
Figure 2 traces out equilibrium values of nh as functions of the level of
inter-market trade costs. At high values of t the symmetric equilibrium is
unique and both systems exist. As t drops below level t, hardware (and
software) standardization (i.e., only one type of hardware remains) becomes
sustainable. For trade costs below t, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
Let us suppose a secular fall in inter-market trade costs. From an initial
position in which two technologies coexist, hardware standardization spon-
taneously arises through a process of intensied indirect network eects. In
what follows, to highlight the interaction between deeper market integration
and software provision, let us examine the following two representative cases.
4.1 The Case of Hardware Dierentiation
In what follows, t (resp. t0) indicates trade costs before (resp. after) integra-
tion. Let us assume that the following condition is satised:
t > t0 > t  ([N=(K  N)])1=( 1); (23)
where N = [(e   c)=f] and K  kb=[(e  c)(   1)]. Note that this
condition holds when the degree of hardware dierentiation (k) is relatively
large (or the degree to which indirect network eects exist is relatively low).
In this case, two types of hardware remain during the process of market
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integration. Thus, no consumer changes his or her hardware and market
integration induces an eectively large number of software varieties for each
type of hardware. From (7), this clearly increases every consumer's utility.
Proposition 1: Given that condition (23) holds, both types of hardware
remain in the equilibrium and both countries gain from deeper market inte-
gration.
4.2 The Case of Hardware Standardization
Next, let us assume that the following condition is satised:17
t > t > t0; (24)
where t (resp. t0) is the trade costs before (resp. after) market integration.
In this case, while both types of hardware exist before integration, only
one type of hardware remains after integration. In other words, intensied
indirect network eects result in a reduced number of hardware varieties (2
rather than 1).
This can be interpreted as follows. An increased number of eective
software varieties intensies indirect network eects, which makes consumers
to choose a hardware with a largest number of software written for that. Due
17Note that   3 is required for this condition.
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to these changes, software rms change their software provision decision: all
software rms choose to write software for a single hardware. Then, the
demand for other type of hardware vanishes.
For simplicity, let us suppose that only Hardware 1 remains after market
integration. In this case, some consumers have to switch from Hardware 0 to
Hardware 1. While there are gains from the increased diversity of software
available, there are losses from switching to the other network. The change
in the indirect utility of a type-s consumer who switches to the other network
is:18
V (t) = [(41=( 1)   1)(N=2)1=( 1)(e  c)(   1)]=(b)  k(1  2t): (25)
Note that the rst term on the RHS represents the gains from software diver-
sication while the second term on the RHS represents costs from increased
disutility. Let us dene a type-~t consumer who is indierent to switching
hardware as follows:
~t = (1=2)  [(41=( 1)   1)(N=2)1=( 1)(e  c)(   1)]=2kb: (26)
Let us dene the solution of 21=( 1)   41=( 1) + 1 = 0 as ~. Then we can
show that ~t > 0 holds when  > ~:
~t  (1=2)  (41=( 1)   1)=21+1=( 1)
18Note that, in the case of hardware standardization, the number of software varieties
for Hardware 1 increases from n1 to 4n1 (or from N=2 to 2N).
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= (21=( 1)   41=( 1) + 1)=2=( 1)
8>><>>:
< 0 if 2 <  < ~
> 0 if  > ~
Now we can state the possibility of losses from market integration.
Proposition 2: If condition (26) and ~    3 are satised and Hardware
1 (resp. 0) dominates the integrated market, both countries' consumers who
located at t 2 [0; ~t] (resp. t 2 [1  ~t; 1]) are made worse o by deeper market
integration.
This implies that trade liberalization leads some consumers to \switch"
to an other-dominated brand, thereby increasing disutility. Note that this
case is highly contrasted with the cases of universal gains from trade, which
are emphasized in the literature. We would like to emphasize that deeper
market integration, which forms a basis for a greater variety of software
products (i.e., intensied indirect network eects), may work as a catalyst
for Pareto inferior outcome.
5 Concluding Remarks
Both deeper market integration and advances in digital technology have
driven particularly large decreases in the costs of inter-market software provi-
sion. In this note, we rst explain the mechanism of how trade costs inuence
21
the software provision decision of software rms. Then, we investigated the
transformation of production/trade patterns given gradually decreasing trade
costs for software products. It is shown that, given that two incompatible
hardware exist, deeper market integration may reduce the variety of hardware
technologies. It is also shown that, if the variety of hardware technologies is
reduced by deeper integration, some consumers are made worse o (Propo-
sition 2). In other words, deeper market integration, which forms the basis
for a greater variety of software products may work as a catalyst for Pareto
inferior outcomes.
The present analysis must be regarded as tentative. Hopefully it provides
a useful paradigm for considering how deeper market integration aect both
the structure of software provision and inter-market trade patterns.
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